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PLANNED GROWTH AS A DETERMINANT
OF THE MARKUP: THE CASE OF
SLOVENIAN MANUFACTURING
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ABSTRACT: The paper follows the idea of heterodox economists that a cost-plus price is
above all a reproductive price and growth price. The authors apply a firm-level model of
markup determination which, in line with theory and empirical evidence, contains proposed firm-specific determinants of the markup, including the firm’s planned growth. The
positive firm-level relationship between growth and markup that is found in data for Slovenian manufacturing firms implies that retained profits gathered via the markup are an
important source of growth financing and that the investment decisions of Slovenian manufacturing firms affect their pricing policy and decisions on the markup size as proposed by
Post-Keynesian theory. The authors thus conclude that at least a partial trade-off between
a firm’s growth and competitive outcome exists in Slovenian manufacturing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged by theory and empirical facts that the formation of price in
manufacturing firms is largely achieved by adding the markup to some sort of average
unit cost. Although a lively discussion about the determinants of the markup has been
underway for several decades, various authors still list and investigate quite mixed factors influencing the size of the markup. The reason behind these differences in opinion
is clearly the complexity of the pricing decision-making process regarding the markup
size. A concern about the factors causing the markup to differ across countries, industries and firms can be found in neoclassical economic theory (Lerner, 1934; Oliver, 1947),
in a more applied and empirically-based branch of mainstream economics, namely in* University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Kardeljeva pl. 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Email: nina.
ponikvar@ef.uni-lj.si
** University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Kardeljeva pl. 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, Email: maks.
tajnikar@ef.uni-lj.si

120

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 11 | No. 2 | 2009

dustrial economics (Bain, 1956; Schmalensee, 1989; Martin, 2001), within the strategic
management school (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1991) and especially within Post-Keynesian
price theory and its pricing hypotheses (Hall and Hitch, 1939; Kalecki, 1954 and Andrews, 1955).
The paper follows the idea of heterodox economists, especially Kalecki (1954) and Eichner (1973), who argue that a cost-plus price is above all a reproductive price and growth
price and accordingly tests the hypothesis that the firm’s investment plans impact on
its pricing decisions and the size of the markup. The study thus focuses on the firm’s
planned growth as one of the firm-specific markup determinants. It is hypothesised that
firms with larger growth ambitions incorporate higher markups into the prices of their
products compared to their rivals. In order to test this hypothesised relationship, the
authors apply a firm-level model of markup determination which in line with theory
and empirical evidence contains proposed firm-specific markup determinants, including the firm’s planned growth. The model also controls for industry membership and
environmental factors and is based on data on Slovenian manufacturing firms for an
11-year period.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The factors determining the markup size can be classified in three general groups. The
first group of determinants includes the characteristics of the firm, usually called firmspecific factors. These factors are connected to the firm’s market power (Kalecki, 1954;
Demsetz, 1973), its cost efficiency and/or the productivity of its production factors and to
the technological characteristics of the firm’s production process and which are chiefly a
result of strategies accepted and pursued by the firm in order to achieve its goal, i.e. longrun profit maximisation and growth (Eichner, 1973). Industry-specific factors represent
the characteristics of a particular industry with regard to the concentration of firms, entry
barriers, product differentiation, technological characteristics of the industry’s production and the demand dynamics (Kalecki, 1954; Schmalensee, 1989). Industry-level factors
determine the average power that firms within a particular industry exert over the price
and the markup of their products. Consequently, these factors determine the average industry markup, while firm-level factors determine the deviations of a firm’s markups from
the industry average. Environmental and institutional factors represent the third group of
markup determinants and consist of governmental anti-trust policy, the role of workers’
and employers’ organisations as well as general economic trends (Motta, 2004; Konings
et al., 2001). The environmental factors are time-specific since they influence all firms in
a particular economy in a similar fashion. While for the most part the industry and environmental characteristics set limits on the markup size, the internal, firm-specific factors
mainly comprise the firm’s activities aimed at realisation of the business plan and achieving the firm’s goal and as such determine the required markup (Shapiro, 1981).
For Kalecki (1954), in cost-determined oligopolistic markets prices are set at the firm
level with reference to average costs and the prices of other firms producing similar prod-
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ucts. Thus, the firm’s price p is p = mu + np, where u are average prime costs, p is the average price charged by all firms in the industry and m and n are parameters characterising
the price-fi xing policy of the firm reflected in the ‘degree of monopoly’1. Accordingly,
prices are expected to vary directly with the level of average direct cost but to be constrained by the price level in the industry, namely the competing group of firms (Kalecki,
1954, p. 13). The firm must ensure that the price does not become too high in relation to
the prices of other firms, for this would drastically reduce sales, and that the price does
not become too low in relation to its average prime cost, for this would drastically reduce
its profit margin. The average price and average degree of monopoly of the industry was
defined by Kalecki (1954, p. 16) with the equation p = u(m/(1 — n)), where p is the average
price of the industry, u are average unit prime costs, m and n are weighted averages of the
coefficients m and n and the expression m/(1 — n) represents the degree of monopoly of
the industry. The firm’s decision on the price and markup is thus subject to various factors deriving from the firm itself or from the firm’s environment.
The idea of a strong linkage between the markup and investment finance has mostly been
developed in theoretical works of non-neoclassical economists, especially within the
Post-Keynesian school such as Eichner (1973, 1976), Eichner and Kregel (1975), Harcourt
and Kenyon (1976), Shapiro (1981), Wood (1975) etc. These authors present a variant of
a model of a price-setting firm facing relatively stable marginal costs, assuming that the
firm’s main objective is its growth and thus the preservation and/or improvement of its
market position. Their models show that investment decisions influence firms’ pricing
decisions, more specifically; they at least partially determine the markup size. Price and
the markup size are thus determined by the firm, not solely by current demand but also
by expected future demand and investment requirements (Kalecki, 1971).
The latter also derives from the empirically confirmed fact that firms gather a large part
of the funds they need for investing from their retained profits in both developing and
developed countries, although institutional and historical factors must be taken into account to explain some of the variation seen across countries (see Hubbard (1998) for a review of empirical studies). Athey and Lumas (1994) along with Athey and Reeser (2000)
in their empirical work using panel data from developed countries find that the availability of internal funds is an important determinant of firms’ capital spending. Similarly,
the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in OECD countries
(Kadapakkan et al., 1998). For the USA, for example, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) test
a panel of small firms and Worthington (1995) a panel of manufacturing firms. They
find that the growth of most of these firms is constrained by internal finance and that
the cash flow and investment spending are positively correlated. Similarly, evidence of
the existence of a liquidity constraint on investment in the Dutch manufacturing sector
can be found in Van Ees et al. (1997). When comparing the dependence of firms on internal finance, Bond et al. (2003) report that there is less dependence on internal financial
sources in the countries of continental Europe, while the external financial constraints
on investment are more serious in the more market-oriented UK financial system.
1

The first important use of the concept of the degree of monopoly was made by Lerner (1934) as a measure of
the welfare loss of a monopoly and not as a measure of market imperfections.
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For transition economies, Konings et al. (2005) confirm that firms’ investment levels in
these countries are sensitive to internal finance, although the sensitivity is not equally
strong in all the investigated countries. They ascertain that the strength of sensitivity to
internal funds depends on the strength of the persistence of soft budget constraints. Similar results are obtained for Slovenia for which empirical studies that are based on aggregate or sectoral data confirm that financial factors, the availability of internal financial
funds as well as the accessibility of external financial sources significantly impact on the
business sector’s investment decisions (Tajnikar and Ogrin, 2001). Based on extensive
survey data for Slovenian firms, Bartlett and Bukvič (2001) similarly identify external
financial constraints, including the high cost of capital, as one of the biggest obstacles to
the growth of small- and medium-sized firms in Slovenia. Accordingly, funds for growth
financing have to be gathered internally.
Financial factors are hence closely related to investment decisions in which internally
generated earnings play a crucial role in investment financing and where external financial funds are a complementary financial source, not a substitute for internal financial
sources. Because the markup size determines the profits and is thus a source of retained
internal financial funds, the pricing decisions of the firm and the size of its markup also
depend on the firm’s aspirations for investing and growth (Harcourt and Kenyon, 1976).
The firm’s growth ambitions, and the factors expressing it, are therefore important firmspecific markup determinants.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
The primary data source for the empirical investigation of markup determinants is the
database of firms’ financial statements collected by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services, which covers the whole population
of Slovenian manufacturing firms and is extended with some of the internal databases of
the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. The database employed in our analysis
contains 35,371 observations for 6,987 manufacturing firms for the 1994-2004 period2.
However, only 20,466 observations on 4,470 firms are without missing values and are
thus regarded as our sample. A firm’s industry membership is defined according to the
five-digit NACE classification of industries and all financial data are in fi xed prices from
the year 2000 in Slovenian tolars. The panel nature of the firm-level data allows us to
combine inter-temporal (within units) as well as inter-firm (between-unit) information
efficiently and to control for unobservable firm-specific variables by focusing on differences over time (Schmalensee, 1989) and to efficiently overcome the problems. In addition, it enables us to test the time persistence of the markup and to study the variability
of markups over time.
2
Firms with missing values and with the highest and lowest 5 percent of markup values were excluded from
the analysis using the method of removing excessive outliers from the dataset introduced by Hadi (1992)
since the excessive outliers could have biased the subsequent results and conclusions.
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3.2 Model and description of the variables
In line with the various theoretical approaches there is a theoretical disagreement about
the list of markup determinants and especially the relative importance of these determinants. Yet, irrespective of the theoretical foundations underpinning the empiricism,
the list of markup factors becomes very similar in the case of empirical investigations
(Porter, 1981). Accordingly, the markup of firm i from industry j in year t is determined
by general economic trends and the economic environment γt, industry-specific factors
ηjt and firm-specific factors εijt. We can thus formulate the most general model of markup
determination as:

markupijt = f (γ t ,η jt , ε ijt )

(1)

where subscript i refers to a firm, j to industries according to the five-digit NACE classification of industries and t to a particular year, respectively. Thus, the markup of firm
i operating in industry j in year t is modelled as a function of firm i’s contemporaneous
characteristics, industry j’s contemporaneous characteristics and the characteristics of
the economic environment in year t (X’it, X’jt and X’t respectively) with unknown weights
β, γ and θ and a lagged dependent variable with an unknown weight δ.
yit = σyit-1 + X'itβ + X'jtγ + X't θ + uit i = 1,…,N; j = 1,…,J; t = 1,...,T

(2)

where yit is the markup for firm i in time period t, δ is a scalar, X’ it, X’jt and X’t are 1 x
K vectors of explanatory variables with unknown K x 1 coefficient vectors β, γ and θ.
Further, a dynamic relationship can be characterised by the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors3. uit is composed of μit = μi + λi + νit, where μi is an
unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effect which allows for heterogeneity in
the means of the average markup across individual firms, λt is a time-specific individualinvariant effect and νit is a disturbance term.
Because the aim of this study is to test the hypothesised impact of a firm’s investment
plans on its markup policy, we estimate a firm-level model with a specification that includes a firm’s planned growth according to firm-specific markup determinants suggested by theory and empirical evidence. The model also controls for industry membership and changes in the economic and institutional environment. The model allows us
first of all to explain the deviations of a firm’s markups from the industry average, and
especially to investigate whether a firm’s growth plans are affecting its pricing decisions.
The variables of the model are specified as follows.
The appropriate empirical measurement of the markup that arises from theory is a contentious issue and empirical results have been shown to be sensitive to the measure of
the margins that is used. In the Industrial Organisation tradition, the difference be3

For the purpose of clarity, the lags and expected values of some variables as well as some interaction terms
between regressors are not explicitly included in the general model, but are considered in detail in the specifications of the empirical model.
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tween price and production costs is usually defined as the price-cost margin (hereinafter ‘PCM’) as proposed by Collins and Preston (1969) and improved by Domowitz,
Hubbard and Petersen (1986), which is a good proxy for Lerner’s degree of monopoly
(Lerner, 1934) on the proposition that MC = AVC. A similar, but theoretically differently based idea of the structure of price is that of Kalecki (1954), according to which
the degree of monopoly (markup μ) is derived from the price equation, where the price
is a product of the markup and the variable unit cost of production. By using sales,
inventories and costs in a similar manner as Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986),
Kalecki’s version of the markup definition as the ratio between price and unit direct
cost of production can be constructed. When multiplied by the quantity produced, the
firm’s markupijt is thus defined as the ratio between a firm’s revenues and direct (variable) costs:
markupijt =

value of salesijt + Δ inventoriesijt
payrollijt + cost of materialijt

(3)

and the average industry markup INDmarkupjt as
INDmarkupjt =

Σ value of salesijt + Σ Δ inventoriesijt
Σ payrollijt + Σ cost of materialijt

(4)

We proxy the firm’s planned growth GRijt, which is the dependent variable that we are
focussing on, by the growth of a firm’s fi xed assets. A one-year lead of asset growth is
included among the regressors as it is presumed that all of the firm’s plans are fully carried into effect in the next year, as proposed by Blecker (1989). We have already argued
that when a product’s price set by an oligopolistic firm is seen first of all as ‘a reproductive price and growth price’ (Lee, 1998), the firm’s growth ambitions become one of the
most important markup determinants (Eichner, 1973) since the markup is the source of
generating profits to finance growth.
Other firm-specific markup determinants are defined as proposed by existing empirical
investigations. Market share MSijt is defined as the share of a firm’s domestic market sales
in the five-digit NACE industry annual sales (the home sales of domestic firms in an industry plus imports in industry j). The simple oligopoly model of firm performance implies a positive relationship between market share and markup size because a firm with a
bigger market share is able to charge higher prices (and therefore achieve a superior level
of markup) due to its stronger markup power (Stigler, 1968). The empirical literature also
shows that the relationship is very likely not to be linear and that a certain threshold
market power (market share) often exists (Feeny and Rogers, 1999; Bennenbroek and
Haris, 1995). However, an opposing hypothesis is that as market share increases competitive pressures are weakened, suggesting that profitability (and the markup) is lower
because the incentive to minimise costs is no longer important. Equally, it is possible that
firms with lower market shares are smaller and more flexible, allowing for lower costs
and higher profitability.
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The criterion for the firm’s sizeijt is the number of employees. Firms are regarded as small
when they have less than 50 employees and as large when they have 250 or more employees. All other firms are regarded as being of a medium size. The impact of size on
the markup can be twofold. On one hand, larger firms have larger market power (Bain,
1956) and/or are more efficient (Penrose, 1972; Demsetz, 1973) and can therefore achieve
higher markups. On the other hand, when the markup is measured in gross form (see
Kalecki, 1954), as in our empirical study, larger firms theoretically have lower overhead
unit costs and can therefore charge lower markups.
The utilisation of production capacities CUijt of firm i from industry j in year t is defined
as a ratio between the actual and potential volume of sales of a firm, where the potential
sales of firm i are a product of the highest existing ratio between sales and production
capacities (fi xed assets) in the period 1994 to 2004 and the production capacities of firm
i from industry j in year t. Production capacities are measured in terms of fi xed assets.
In a short-term analysis, the production capacities of a firm and its capacity costs are
given. However, a firm can produce various quantities of output with the same production capacities. There are three possible effects of a firm’s production capacity utilisation
on the markup size. The first is the negative effect of capacity utilisation on the markup
size in the case of target return pricing (Lanzillotti, 1958). The second is a positive effect
due to the higher technical efficiency of a firm, which utilises its production capacities
better (Blecker, 1989). The more the firm utilises its capacities, the higher the output it
produces. At given unit variable costs and at a given price, fi xed unit costs are lower at
a higher production capacity utilisation and consequently the markup can be higher.
The third source of a possible positive relationship between capacity utilisation and the
markup level is the incentive of an oligopolistic firm to keep some level of reserve capacities, allowing the exploitation of any chance increase in selling power and acting as a
competitive weapon (Sylos-Labini, 1969). The higher capacity utilisation of a firm also
indicates that fewer reserve capacities are available and that a firm is moving closer to
full capacity utilisation. The latter forces the firm to plan its investments in additional
production capacity in order to be able to adapt to changing demand conditions with
some level of reserve capacity. The last two reasons speak in favour of a positive capacity
utilisation-markup level linkage.
A firm’s labour productivity Lprodijt is defined as the value added per employee in real
terms, the price of labour on firm level wijt is calculated by dividing real annual gross
wages by the average number of employees for each firm, while the price of capital rijt
is defined as the ratio of the sum of depreciation and the cost of financing to the sum
of fi xed assets and inventory. More productive firms are able to charge higher markups
due to their lower unit costs at given prices of inputs. It is therefore expected that labour
productivity explains the variability of the firm-level markups of firms within the same
industry since these firms compete with each other. In addition, the price set for a particular product by a firm is the sum of the unit production cost and the markup. Higher
production factor prices on the firm-level, leading to higher production costs and also
to higher unit costs, do not always result in higher prices. How much of the higher costs
will be spilled over into higher prices depends on the strength of the competition within
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a particular industry. When the competition among firms within the same industry is
strong enough, it is able to prevent the complete (or even any) transformation of the
higher unit cost into higher prices of final products. In such cases, higher production
costs, especially the cost of labour, which are not covered by the firm’s markup, lead to
lower markups. Because the markup is defined in a gross form, it is composed of one
part for profit and another part for covering overhead costs (including capital costs). It is
thus expected that a higher capital price leads to a higher cost of capital and therefore to
a higher markup at a given level of sales.
A firm’s export orientation EXorijt is measured by the share of revenues from exports in
the total annual sales of firm i. Empirical literature and theory suggests that firms that
sell their products in domestic and foreign markets are disciplined by foreign competition and thus charge lower markups within their price (Bughin, 1996; Caves and Porter,
1980), although the direction of the impact of an export orientation on markups also
depends on the market structure and institutional framework.
The capital intensity of a firm’s production KIijt is calculated as the ratio of total fi xed
assets to the number of employees. Firms with a higher capital intensity of production
compared to the industry average are expected to have a lower firm-level markup compared to the average markup in the industry due to their inferior cost efficiency (Coelli
et al., 1998). This implies a higher capital cost per unit of output and, at a given output’s
price, it leads to a lower markup. Further, studies using price-cost margins or markup
as a dependent variable generally employ the capital/revenue ratio as a control because
the margins and markup are used in their gross form (see the overview in Schmalensee, 1989). A positive relationship between the capital intensity of production and the
markup size should only appear on the industry level where more capital demanding
technology leads to higher industry-level markups.
The broad literature on profit persistence (Mueller, 1977; Mueller and Cubbin, 1990) suggests that current markups will be heavily influenced by the past realisation of such.
Econometrically, this necessitates the additional inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
in the basic specification. In addition, a serial correlation of markups and profit margins
is empirically observed in time series (Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). Both issues suggest that current output conjectures may depend on previous performance.
The model is thus specified as:
markupijt =
α + β1 markupij,t-1 + β2INDmarkupjt + β3Grai(t+1) + β4MSit + β5MS2it + β6EXorit +
+ β7Lprodit + β8wit + β9rit + β10KIit + β11CUit + uit

(5)

where subscript i refers to a firm, subscript j to industries according to the five-digit
NACE classification of industries and subscript t to a particular year, respectively. The
average industry-level markup is included in the model in order to control for the influence of industry and market characteristics as well as the impact of environmental and
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institutional factors, which influence all firms in a particular industry in the same year
in the same fashion.
In Table 1 the characteristics of an average firm in the sample according to the year and
firm size are described.
TABLE 1: Characteristics of the database
1994 to 2004 period average
Markup
Annual growth of fixed assets
Average number of employees
Market share

All firms
1.125
1.07
55
2.4

Small firms
1.134
6.88
7
1.0

Medium firms
1.078
1.41
117
6.5

Large firms
1.095
1.02
658
15.1

In the 1994–2004 period the average Slovenian manufacturing firm from the sample
employed 55 people and had a market share of 2.4 percent. This average firm set its prices
12.5 percent above its variable unit costs although the average markup varied from 11
to 14 percent in the 1994-2004 period. According to the size class, small firms achieved
the highest and medium-sized firms the lowest markups on average, while large firms
remained in the middle during the whole investigated period. The average firm had an
average annual growth of fi xed assets (in real terms) of 1 percent, while on average the
growth in the value of a firm’s fi xed assets was negative at the beginning of the 1994–
2004 period and positive in later years.
The model is estimated in three specifications, denoted I, II and III respectively. Specification I includes all firm-level markup determinants proposed by theory and empirical
literature as well as the average industry-level markup as a control variable for the industry-specific factors and changes in the economic environment. In specification II a set of
year time dummies is additionally tested as a measure of the impact of the changes in the
environment, while a firm’s size is added in the form of a set of size dummies in the third
specification (III). The latter specification is included because the descriptive statistics
of the data (see Ponikvar, 2008 and Table 1) show that in Slovenian manufacturing the
characteristics regarding a firm’s capital intensity, export orientation, price of production factors and productivity differ a great deal among small, medium and large firms.

3.3 Method
The lagged dependent variable among the regressors complicates the application of the
markup dynamic panel since yit is a function of μi and it thus immediately follows that
yi,t-1 is also a function of μi. Therefore, yi,t-1, the right-hand side regressor in the model is
correlated with the error term and the OLS estimator is thus biased. Further, the usual
panel data techniques cannot be used for the above equation since they are biased and
inconsistent as N→∝ and finite T in a dynamic setting (Nickell, 1981). In addition, the
fact that the specification of models includes firm-specific variables can also imply the
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possibility of endogeneity arising from individual effects, that is from the fact that firmlevel variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved firm-specific effects μi. Besides, the possibility of simultaneity bias should also be considered since, according to
the theoretical origins of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, some fundamental variables in the model of firm performance (e.g. markup, concentration, product
differentiation) are jointly determined (Hay and Morris, 1991) and as such do not satisfy
the zero-conditional-mean assumption. In our case, the most apparent possible source
of endogeneity among the regressors are sellers’ concentration, market share, import
penetration, export orientation etc.
These issues prevent the standard procedures for estimating panel data models from
being consistent and/or efficient. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the Generalised
Method of Moments procedure (hereinafter ‘AB GMM’) which offers a large feasible
instrument set by exploring instruments motivated by moment conditions, compared
to Anderson and Hsiao (1982). The instruments include suitable lags of the levels of endogenous variables, which enter the equation in differenced form, as well as strictly exogenous regressors and any others that might be specified. It is argued that all the xi,t
are also valid instruments for the first differenced equation if xi,t are correlated with μi.
This permits us to exploit both the cross-section and time-series elements of the data in
constructing instruments and hence yields efficiency gains relative to other estimation
methods for panel data. In the case of the presence of heteroscedasticity in the model, a
two-step procedure should be used where the first-step residuals are used to compute the
variance covariance matrix in a second step. In other words, Δν it need to be replaced by
differenced residuals obtained from the one-step estimator and the resulting estimator
becomes the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator. The consistency of the two Arellano
Bond GMM estimators hinges heavily upon the assumption that the E (ν it ν i (t − 2) ) = 0 ,
where E is the mathematical expectation. E (ν it ν i (t −1) ) = 0 need not be zero since the
ν it are differences of serially uncorrelated errors. Arellano and Bond (1991) therefore
propose a test of hypothesis H0 that there is no second-order serial correlation for the
disturbances of the first-differenced equation with the test statistic m2 for second-order
serial correlation based on residuals from the first-differenced equation. A further aspect
of interest concerns the validity of the chosen instruments above the minimum set necessary for econometric identification. Although we cannot test the validity of the instruments directly, we can assess the adequacy of instruments in an over-identified context
with a test of over-identifying restrictions. If we reject the null hypothesis of such test,
we cast doubt on the suitability of the instrument set and establish that one or more of
the applied instruments do not appear to be uncorrelated with the disturbance process
(Baum, 2006). In our case, a test of over-identifying restrictions as advised by Sargan
(1958) is used.

4. RESULTS
The null hypothesis of the Wald test that the estimated coefficients of all regressors are all
zero is rejected in all of the tested specifications. The moment conditions in the model are
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appropriate since the null hypothesis of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions
cannot be rejected, which is also our case. Crucial for dynamic models is the absence of
autocorrelation of differenced model residuals of order 2. It is evident from the test statistics m2 that in none of the model specifications does such an autocorrelation exist. On
the other hand, the null hypothesis that average autocorrelation in residuals of order 1
is 0 is rejected, which is also what was expected with regard to the estimation technique
applied.
TABLE 2: Firm-specific markup determinants
Dependent variable:
Specification I
Firm-level markup
Markup(-1)
0.1306 (7.46)**
INDmarkup
0.2082 (8.60)**
žMS
-0.6633 (-6.97)**
MS2
0.5926 (5.94)**
EXor
-0.1285 (-3.35)**
GRa (+1)
0.0096 (4.73)**
Lprod
0.0000029 (5.51)**
W
-0.000055 (-9.84)**
R
0.1221 (2.09)*
KI
0.0000052 (5.48)**
CU
0.0222 (3.88)**
Medium size firm
Large size firm
Year dummy
NO
Constant
0.0051 (4.97)**
No. of observations
20466
No. of firms (i)
4470
Instrumented
MS, EXor, CU
(df) Wald χ2
(11) 322.05**
(df) Sargan χ2
(140) 187.33
m1
-15.24**
m2
0.10
Notes:
- t-statistics are in parentheses
- **,* denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively

Specification II

Specification III

0.1285 (7.32)**
0.2075 (7.91) **
-0.5337 (-5.86)**
0.5005 (5.18)**
-0.1507 (-3.68)**
0.0091 (4.50)**
0.0000031 (5.97)**
-0.00006 (-10.69)**
0.0806 (1.36)
0.0000055 (5.78)**
0.0251 (4.34)**

0.1275 (7.27)**
0.2076 (7.94)**
-0.5297 (-5.82)**
0.4978 (5.18)**
-0.1496 (-3.62)**
0.0091 (4.49)**
0.0000031 (5.95)**
-0.00006 (-10.59)**
0.0800 (1.35)
0.0000055 (5.77)**
0.0253 (4.36)**
-0.0032 (-0.35)
-0.0147 (-1.14)
YES
0.0080 (1.99)*
20466
4470
MS, EXor, CU
(21) 424.72**
(140) 143.51
-15.21**
0.02

YES
0.0080 (6.77)**
20466
4470
MS, EXor, CU
(19) 416.52**
(140) 143.42
-15.23**
0.03

The size and signs of the estimated regression coefficients are mostly in accordance with
the theoretical expectations, with their size remaining relatively stable regardless of
changes in the model specification, which is an indicator of the model’s robustness.
The firm’s planned growth positively impacts on the markup size, as proposed by PostKeynesian theory. The size of the estimated coefficient of planned growth on the markup
size is stable in all specifications. Various economic reasons can be provided to explain
this link. First, retained profits are a prime source of capital for a firm seeking expansion
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and/or, alternatively, if a firm seeks to raise capital externally, adequate profitability is
likely to be viewed by lenders as an important prerequisite. Second, according to the institutional theory of the firm the main objective of the ‘megacorp’ is to grow and expand
its market share (Eichner, 1973). In addition, according to well-known managerial theories whereby managers have a discretion to pursue their own objectives as well, growth
as well as profit may enter the firm’s objective function and are thus positively correlated.
Our results show that profits accumulated from markups are needed to finance growth (a
high markup today is a precursor of high growth in the next period). Similar results are
reported by Goddard et al., (2005) for a panel of manufacturing firms from the EU.
The direction of the impact of other regressors in the model is in accordance with the expectations. Firm-level markups relative to the industry average are higher when labour is
more productive and when the price of labour is lower. On the other hand, the firm-level
price of capital measured on the does not affect the markup size in a significant way. The
linear relationship between a firm’s market share and firm-level markup is significant
and negative. Such a result is not predicted by the oligopoly models and is in contrast
to some similar studies for developed European countries (see Goddard et al., 2005 for
a review). One possible explanation is that being small is more advantageous in a small
economy such as Slovenia. However, empirical literature has provided evidence of a Ushaped relationship between market share and profitability. In our case, when the possibility of both the linear and non-linear impact of the market share size on the markup
is incorporated in the model the linear link remains statistically significantly negative,
while the quadratic link is significantly positive. It is thus possible to identify the ‘threshold’ market share size above which the market share starts to increase markups and it
is surprisingly high, amounting to a 53 percent market share. Other studies for larger
economies (e.g. Fenny et al., 2005 for Australia) find this threshold market share to be
much smaller. An acceptable explanation is that a firm must have a relatively large market share in the small Slovenian market to obtain enough market power in a general
product market to be able to achieve higher prices and increase its markups.
Exposure to competition in foreign markets obviously decreases firms’ markup sizes in
Slovenian manufacturing. This is also confirmed in studies for manufacturing in other
countries (e.g. Bennenbroek and Harris, 1995; Kambhampati and Parikh, 2003). Evidently,
stronger competitive pressure due to greater exposure to competition abroad and the higher
export orientation of firms decreases markups. In addition, large Slovenian manufacturing
firms are more export-oriented and have smaller markups on average (Ponikvar, 2008).
The result that the higher capital intensity of a firm’s production increases a firm’s
markup relative to the industry average was not expected since a firm’s higher capital
intensity of production relative to the industry average means inferior cost efficiency and
should therefore result in a firm’s lower markup relative to the industry markup. A positive link between the markup and the capital intensity of production is only expected to
appear at the industry level. However, our results are in line with some other empirical
studies (Bennenbroek and Harris, 1995; Feeny et al., 2005) where the difference between
the industry- and firm-level impact was not accounted for. Firm-level capacity utilisation
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also increases firm-level markups. The higher utilisation of a firm’s production capacities means higher production (and possible revenues) at a given capital cost. Hence the
achieved markups of firms can be higher at a given price. Similar results can be found in
Bennenbroek and Harris (1995) for manufacturing industries in New Zealand.
Descriptive statistics of the dataset applied in the analysis (see Ponikvar, 2008) show that
larger firms achieve lower markups on average, which is a logical consequence of the
markup’s gross definition. However, this is not confirmed in our models (III) where the
impact of a firm’s size (measured by dummy variables for small, medium and large firms)
on markups is negative but insignificant.
The estimated coefficient on the lagged markup is positive and significant. These results
are in line with the findings of the persistence of profitability literature (see the overview
in Mueller and Cubbin, 1990). The coefficient amounts to approximately 0.13. It indicates
that a 1 percent increase in the last year’s firm-level markup will result in a 0.13 percent
increase in this year’s firm-level markup. In other words, 87 percent of the total adjustment in a firm’s markup from a shock will occur in the first year, while 13 percent will
not. This indicates that in Slovenian manufacturing the return of the markup to some
equilibrium level is monotonic (δ<1) and fast. The size of the obtained ‘persistence’ coefficient for Slovenian manufacturing firms is relatively small compared to studies for other economies. In estimations for other countries the coefficients on the lagged dependent
variable in performance equations range from 0.2 to almost 0.5 (Fenny et al., 2005 and
McDonald, 1999 for manufacturing firms in Australia; Machin and Van Reenen, 1993
for UK firms; Goddard et al., 2005 for Belgium, France, Italy and the UK). One possible
explanation is that the markup definition in our study follows Kalecki’s definition while
the abovementioned studies use PCM as the dependent variable. Another, more contentoriented reason is that the relatively large export orientation of manufacturing firms,
their exposure to competition abroad, the relatively large import penetration and relative smallness of Slovenian markets force manufacturing firms in Slovenia to adapt their
markups to changed market conditions faster than in other larger economies.
The average industry markup included among the regressors shows a positive and significant impact on the markup of firms that belong to the industry. An increase in the average markup in an industry by 1 percentage point influences firms within this industry
to increase their own markups on average by 0.2 of a percentage point. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient thus shows the interdependence of the pricing decisions of firms within a particular industry. It thus empirically confirms the theoretical
markup pricing equation (Kalecki, 1954, p.12), in which the pricing decision of a firm is
influenced by its characteristics as well as the average industry price.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that the differences seen in markups among Slovenian manufacturing firms within the same industry can be explained by differences in their ambitions to
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grow, differences in their market share, differences in the utilisation of their production
capacity, differences in the price of labour and productivity of their labour, the capital
intensity of their production and differences in their export orientation.
In Slovenian manufacturing investment decisions affect the pricing policy and the decisions on the markup size, as proposed by Post-Keynesian theory. Our results show that
planned growth positively affects the size of a firm’s markup relative to its rivals, which
confirms our hypothesis. We may conclude that the profits accumulating from markups
are obviously needed to finance growth (a high markup today is a precursor of high
growth in the next period).
This empirical evidence on the positive firm-level relationship between growth and
markup also has some policy implications. It has generally been acknowledged that competitive pressure reduces markups, forces firms to organise themselves more efficiently
and, as such, increases economic welfare. It would thus be socially desired for competitive pressures to be high and markups to be relatively low. On the other hand, the empirical evidence shows that firms which grow faster have higher markups compared to firms
with lower growth ambitions. Economic growth can therefore be achieved only when
markups are not on low competitive levels. Restrictive competition and/or antitrust policy might therefore, although resulting in a more competitive industrial environment
and firms’ decreased market power, slow down the grow path of Slovenian manufacturing industries since they limit the source of internal funds for investment financing via
decreased markups. Obviously, at least a partial trade-off between a firm’s growth and
competitive outcome exists, which is an important issue that has to be considered by
competition policy authorities when adopting policy measures. The same also holds for
restrictive fiscal policy.
The empirical evidence also reveals the interdependence of the pricing decisions of firms
within a particular industry since any change in the industry markup is reflected in the
markup size of the firm. The theoretical markup pricing equation (Kalecki, 1954, p.12),
in which a firm’s pricing decision is influenced by its characteristics as well as by the average industry price, is thus confirmed in the case of Slovenian manufacturing.
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